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Corporate financing decisions under ambiguity:  
pecking order and liquidity policy implications 
 
Abstract: This paper addresses the following unresolved questions from the perspective of 
ambiguity theory: Why do some firms issue equity instead of debt? Why did most firms retain 
their cash holdings instead of distributing them as dividends in recent times?  How do firms 
change their financing policies during a period of severe financial constraints and ambiguity, or 
when facing the threat of an unpredictable financial crisis? We analyze how the values of the 
firm’s equity and debt are affected by ambiguity. We also show that cash holdings are retained 
longer if the investors’ ambiguity aversion bias is sufficiently large, while cash holdings 
become less attractive when the combined impact of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion is 
relatively low. 
Keywords: Business decision-making; Ambiguity aversion; Corporate liquidity; Pecking 
order; Cash holdings; Dividend policy. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last three decades, there have been many developments in decision theory that improved our 
understanding of uncertainty. In line with Knight (1921), uncertainty can be divided into two well-defined 
distinct parts, risk and ambiguity. “Risk” is used to refer to any sort of uncertainty that can be defined through 
the existence of a probabilistic model based on one single probability assessment, which is known to the 
decision maker (DM). “Ambiguity” is used to refer to situations in which the DM appears to be not fully 
confident that his/her beliefs apply. Practically, risk is mostly used when uncertainty is calculable, i.e. both 
outcomes and a subjective probability distribution over outcomes can be specified. Ambiguity applies to 
situations where uncertainty is incalculable, i.e. where there is no clear perception of the possible outcomes or 
of an estimate of a single plausible probability distribution. At least since Ellsberg (1961), experimental studies 
in ambiguous settings have repeatedly shown that DMs usually prefer to deal with known, rather than unknown 
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probabilities, thereby revealing a form of ambiguity aversion (see, f.e, Mousavi and Gigerenzer, 2014 for a 
discussion of risk and uncertainty).  
Although the recent literature on ambiguity has provided a unified and elegant framework to address (and often 
solve) some financial puzzles (e.g. the equity premium puzzle and the interest rate puzzle, see Epstein and 
Schneider, 2010), there are still ill-understood phenomena in corporate finance, whose explanation, in our view, 
might benefit from the ambiguity theory perspective.  
Recent studies document a secular increase in the cash holdings of some firms (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009; 
Denis and Sibikov, 2010; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Holberg, Phillips and Prabhala, 2014). In 2010 the 
Federal Reserve reported that cash holdings of U.S. corporations experienced the largest-ever increase in 
records going back to 1952.  Cash increased very fast after 2008, growing at an annual rate of 11 percent until 
2014.  US non-financial companies held $1.82 trillion of cash at the end of 2014, including technology, 
pharmaceutical and industrial giants, such as Apple Inc., Pfizer Inc., and General Motors Co.  “The rising 
corporate cash balances could represent a longer-term behavioral shift in the wake of the deepest financial crisis 
in decades” (The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2010). One reason could be that firms facing deep uncertainty 
about future transactions and vague economic perspectives may find it beneficial to pile up significant amounts 
of cash as a cushion. And yet, both anecdotal
1
 and large sample evidence points to an incentive for managers to 
avoid visible accumulation of cash holdings. Moreover, one would expect that the precautionary demand for 
cash should decrease when firms can hedge more effectively as more types of derivatives are available, e.g. as a 
consequence of improvements in information and financial technology since the early 1980s. Thus, the observed 
increase in cash holdings represents an anomaly that challenges existing theories.  
Various empirical studies are inconclusive about the hierarchy or “pecking order” among different sources of 
funds (see Leary and Roberts, 2010, and references there). Some have documented a significant heterogeneity in 
corporate decisions attributed to a divergence in beliefs about the firm’s value between managers and the market 
(see also Lins, Servaes and Tufano, 2010, about investor preferences and cross-country differences in corporate 
financial decisions). Behavioral explanations of corporate decisions have recently come to consider “managers’ 
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 An often cited anecdotal example is Kirk Kerkorian’s attack on Chrysler in the past century, showing that large cash 
holdings drew the action of  shareholders who could threaten managers’ position.  
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personality traits” (Hackbarth, 2008, 2009), which may include their attitude towards ambiguity. But whether 
the choice between equity or debt finance is affected by managers’ personality traits and their perception biases 
is still controversial (see, for example, Breuer, Rieger and Soypak, 2014b). Some evidence indicates that 
executives often believe that their common equity is undervalued by the market, but in other cases, and 
especially following bad periods in the stock market, CFOs tend to focus on downside risk in their analysis and 
think their stock is overvalued (see, f.e., Ben-David, Graham and Harvey, 2013), leading to the insight that these 
contrasting findings could be “reconciled by means of a behavioural perspective to corporate finance” 
(Hackbarth, 2008). 
Our main objective is to advance a behavioural perspective for studying equity holders and debt holders 
decisions. We integrate ambiguity into a contingent claim model to analyse what happens when DMs are 
rational in all respects, except for how they perceive the firm’s future. The behavioural biases impact on firm’s 
financing decisions and, in particular, on the values of corporate securities. Our paper sets out to answer the 
following unresolved questions: Why do certain firms issue equity instead of debt? Why did most firms retain 
their cash holdings instead of distributing them as dividends in recent times?  How do firms change their 
financing policies during a period of severe financial constraints and ambiguity, or when facing the threat of a 
financial crisis in the foreseeable future? Our paper tries to provide answers within the framework of a dynamic 
model which incorporates ambiguity and the investor’s attitude towards it. Our goal is not to challenge existing 
works addressing such issues; rather we try to reveal some missing ingredients of corporate policies. We model 
the corporate decisions as real options and apply the mathematics of mixed singular control/optimal stopping 
methods in stochastic settings under ambiguity. In particular, we analyze how the values of the firm’s equity and 
debt are affected by ambiguity (Propositions 1 and 2) and relate our results to the pecking order puzzle 
(Proposition 3); moreover, we show how ambiguity affects cash holdings and optimal dividend policies 
(Propositions 4 and 5). We find that the presence of a standard pecking order or its reverse may depend on the 
relative ambiguity aversion biases of the managers and the investors: if managers have a stronger ambiguity 
aversion bias than the market, then a reversal of the standard pecking order preferences can be obtained. Finally, 
we find that cash holdings are retained longer if the impact of the ambiguity aversion bias is sufficiently large, 
which is consistent with the observed change in cash holdings in periods of turbulence and vague uncertainty. 
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Cash holdings become less attractive with relatively small ambiguity aversion biases, in which case the DM 
prefers to receive dividends instead. 
 
           2.  LITERATURE AND THEORY 
          2.1. BEHAVIOURAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND AMBIGUITY THEORY 
Corporate finance theory has recently started considering common personality traits of managers, 
behavioural biases, investors’ sentiment in modeling the complex decision-making processes in 
corporations. For example, excessive optimism and overconfidence have been described as frequently 
observed managers’ behaviours,  since the survey evidence by Graham and Harvey (2001). DMs who 
tend to be overconfident about their abilities overestimate those abilities. Those who are overconfident 
about their knowledge (i.e., overconfidence in the sense of “miscalibration”, see Hackbarth, 2009) tend 
to establish excessively narrow confidence intervals. Alternative examples of biases are due to “mental 
accounting” (Thaler, 1980), where DMs set reference points for the accounts that determine gains and 
losses (leading eventually to “disposition effects”, Shefrin and Statman, 1985), and often assign 
different weights to events with negative or positive realizations. Thus, there may be “mistakes” that 
managers make because of cognitive imperfections and emotional influences, which add up to other 
behavioural errors by investors, too. As a result, “judgements may be based on feelings rather than 
underlying fundamentals” (Shefrin, 2009). These errors can create a wedge between fundamental 
values and market prices and may determine important implications for the practice of corporate 
finance. 
Such distortions seem to be further amplified when financial markets are abnormally uncertain. In 
times of economic turbulence, like the recent recession and the financial catastrophe that erupted in 
August 2007, new forms of uncertainty become truly relevant in financial strategies. In particular, 
ignorance and ambiguity attitudes may influence the valuation processes by the managers and the 
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investors
2
. In an ambiguity world, people are very insecure about what they know. Consequently, 
small slivers of information can cause prices to leap and plummet, with decisions far from a standard 
probabilistic rule. In some cases, unrealistic pessimism characterizes the DM’s behaviour, involving 
overestimating the probabilities of unfavorable events and underestimating the probabilities of 
favourable events. Charness and Gneezy (2010) demonstrated experimentally that people are willing to 
pay a price to avoid ambiguity, and this affects their financial decisions. As recent psychometric tests 
and experimental evidence confirm, “there is a clear evidence that an average ambiguity aversion is the 
typical qualitative finding” (Trautman and Van De Kuile, 2013).  A recurrent issue concerns the 
omission of incalculable risk and the impact of investors’ sentiment and ambiguity on managers’ 
“cognitive assessment” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) of option values and investment/financing 
opportunities. Under uncertainty, DMs are not sure about the likelihood of the states of nature and their 
valuation of option payoffs “are subject to vagueness, behavioural biases and partial ignorance” 
(Driouchi, Trigeorgis and Gao, 2015).  
Some papers have recently embedded ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes into economic decisions that 
can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping problems. Miao and Wang (2011)  employ 
the recursive multiple-priors utility model developed by Epstein and Wang (1994) to incorporate 
ambiguity in the study of real investment and exit  problems. They show that ambiguity may accelerate 
or delay option exercise, depending on the relative degrees of ambiguity about continuation and 
termination payoffs. Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) apply the continuous time multiple-priors utility 
model developed by Chen and Epstein (2002) and show that irreversible investment decisions are 
delayed because of ambiguity. Asano and Shibata (2014) employ the multiple-priors utility model in 
the context of natural capital investment and environmental policies, while Gao and Driouchi (2013) 
apply this methodology to rail transit investment. These contributions employ multiple-priors models 
involving real options, but do not deal with corporate finance problems. In all these real option 
                                                 
2
 Various papers linked ambiguity and financial crises (see, f.e., Routledge and Zin, 2009, Boyarchenko, 2010 and 
Driouchi, Trigeorgis, and So, 2015).  
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valuation models, ambiguity deforms the objective probability distribution by changing the drift of the 
relevant stochastic processes, leaving however the standard deviation constant. 
In our paper ambiguity is taken into account following a different approach. Our ambiguity-based 
analysis goes beyond the maximin or “worst case” criterion of the multi-prior utility model and uses 
“capacities” (Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 2008), representing DMs beliefs in the stochastic 
processes of the underlying assets. The approach of dynamically consistent Choquet random walks 
(Kast and Lapied 2010, Kast, Lapied and Roubaud, 2014) we follow is especially suitable to model the 
problems in corporate finance. On one hand, it  allows to model the embedded ambiguity in a simple 
and parsimonious way, by representing the level of ignorance, hence the attitude towards ambiguity, 
throughout a single parameter, c. More importantly, in contrast with previous frameworks, ambiguity 
is perceived both in the deformation of the mean and of the variance of the relevant stochastic 
processes, and both are a concern in corporate decision making. As a consequence, the resulting 
'deformed' Brownian motion exhibiting both a lower drift and volatility than in the classical 
'probabilistic' case, makes the applications to corporate finance more realistic and, at the same time, 
less trivial to obtain than under the alternative modeling of ambiguity. In the next section we present 
our model set-up. 
 
2.2. THE MODEL SET-UP IN THE CHOQUET FRAMEWORK 
When considering a DM facing ambiguity, the Choquet Expected Utility approach represents his/her 
beliefs by a non-additive unit measure, which is referred to as a capacity. Applying the Choquet 
integral of a capacity to a given vector of outcomes (an ‘act’) generates an implied probability 
distribution over the outcomes, on the basis of which the expected utility value is calculated. But in 
contrast to subjective expected utility theory, there may no longer exist a single implied probability 
distribution over the states of nature that applies for all acts. Rather, the implied probability 
distribution may change according to the ranking of the states of nature regarding the desirability of 
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the outcomes obtained for them. For acts that generate the same ranking of the states of nature, i.e. co-
monotonic acts, the same implied probability distribution applies. So if attention is restricted to a set of 
co-monotonic acts only, the results are indistinguishable from subjective expected utility, with the 
subjective probability distribution equalling the implied probability distribution (see a.o. Schmeidler, 
1989). In the Choquet Expected Utility model a capacity simultaneously represents the ambiguity 
experienced by the decision maker and his/her attitude towards this ambiguity
3
. We refer to the 
combined effect of the perceived ambiguity and the DM’s ambiguity aversion as his/her ambiguity 
aversion bias.  
In what follows we adopt a dynamic framework, following Kast and Lapied (2010). Suppose that the 
firm’s asset value, tV , follows a Choquet–Brownian process
4
. It is defined on the basis of a binomial 
lattice, where for each st at time t, such that 0 ≤ t ≤ T, st+1
u
 and st+1
d
 denote the possible successors at 
time t + 1 for an “up” and a “down” movement, respectively. If “up” and “down” movements have the 
same capacity, then υ(st
u
|st) = υ(st
d
|st) = c, where c, 0 < c < 1, is a constant that represents the DM’s 
ambiguity about the likelihood of the states to come. If the DM is ambiguity averse, the capacity is 
sub-linear, so that c < 1/2 (Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 2008). If the perceived ambiguity 
increases, the value of the parameter c moves further away from the anchor 1/2. Thus, the capacity 
becomes more convex (for an ambiguity averse DM) or more concave (for an ambiguity loving DM). 
The symmetric discrete process outlined above can be shown to converge to a continuous time 
generalized Wiener process with mean m = 2c – 1 and variance s2 = 4c(1-c). The absence of an 
ambiguity bias is obtained as a special case for c = 1/2. Thus, the firm’s asset value is given by5: 
                                                 
3
 Recent research differentiates between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, but in many cases, the resulting complications 
tend to be circumvented by assuming (full) ambiguity aversion. Under this additional assumption the capacity only 
describes the ambiguity experienced by the DM (see e.g. Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant, 2007).   
4
 A Choquet-Brownian process  is a distorted Brownian process, where the distortion derives from the nature and intensity 
of preferences toward ambiguity (Kast, Lapied and Roubaud, 2014). See also Driouchi, Trigeorgis and Gao (2015). For 
ambiguous random walks represented by a binomial tree, Kast and Lapied (2010) assume independence of the conditional 
capacities and show that additive random walks converge to Brownian motions for which an increase in ambiguity 
decreases both the drift and the variance. 
 
5
 Expression (1) is obtained  from tt VdV / tdWdtqr  )( , where tt sBmtW    and tB  is a Wiener process. 
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dVt/Vt = ((r– q) + mσ)dt + sσdBt                                                 (1) 
 
where r is the discount rate, reflecting the DM’s subjective valuation which is used for discounting, q 
is the instantaneous payout, or rate of return on the firm’s assets, determining the internal liquidity of 
the firm from its cash flows, σ is the volatility, and Bt is a Wiener process. For fully ambiguity averse 
DMs we have - 1 < m < 0 and 0 < s < 1, so r – q + m < r - q and 0 < s  <  . Both drift and 
volatility are reduced in comparison to the case where ambiguity is absent. That is, for c<1/2 mass is 
shifted to the “worst state” outcome, by applying the Choquet integral6, so that the drift falls. Notice 
also the new result on the perceived variance of the process, which is reduced by the ambiguity 
aversion bias. Ambiguity aversion is an aversion to not precisely known probability distributions, 
which leads to “miscalibration”, in the sense of a narrower confidence interval for the variance around 
the lower mean, resulting in an underestimation of the volatility of the associated random events.  
We assume that the firm issues perpetual debt which pays a continuous coupon at the rate C. The firm 
uses its revenue to make the coupon payment or to pay equity holders’ dividends. When revenues are 
not sufficient and in the absence of cash balances, the firm can decide either to issue new equity or to 
declare bankruptcy. Thus, if the revenue rate exceeds the coupon rate (qV   C), equity holders receive 
dividends; if the revenue rate falls below the coupon rate, the firm dilutes equity.  Equity dilution is 
costly and we assume that the cost of equity dilution is proportional to the proceeds from issuance. 
Thus, following the argument about equity dilution in Asvanunt, Broadie and Sundaresan (2011), it is 
equivalent to a negative dividend of  (qV – C).  Below a critical value 
BV  the firm will declare 
                                                 
6
 Following Kelsey and Spanjers (2004), let the ambiguity level of a capacity v at an event E S be v (E)=1-v(S-E)-v(E). 
For convex capacities, ambiguity levels attain non-negative values only. For example, if we let 1u for states in E and 2u for 
states in S-E, then for 1u > 2u  the Choquet integral of u with respect to v equals 
)()())(1()( 2121 ESvuEvuEvuEvu  + vu 2 (E), while for 1u < 2u we obtain )()( 21 ESvuEvu  + 
vu 1 (E), that is, in each case, the bad outcome is over-weighted by the ambiguity level v . If a DM’s beliefs are 
represented by a convex capacity, then he puts more weight on bad outcomes than an expected utility maximize would. 
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bankruptcy: that is, 
BV denotes the firm’s endogenous default threshold and is obtained as a result of 
equity holders’ optimization, as in Leland (1994). In the event of default, debt holders receive (1- 
α)
BV where α denotes the fraction of cash flows lost due to default costs. In the next section we 
compute the total values of the firm’s equity and debt in the presence of ambiguity, for the current 
value of its asset. 
 
2.3. EQUITY AND DEBT UNDER AMBIGUITY AVERSION 
For a given value of the firm’s assets V, we denote the total value of its equity by E(V) and the total 
value of its debt by D(V). Using standard dynamic programming methods (see Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994), in the Appendix we derive the following expression for the value of the firm’s equity: 
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Here we use 1  to denote the positive solution and ω2 to denote the negative solution. The bankruptcy 
threshold VB is derived by maximizing the value of equity with respect to VB. Since E(V)  depends on 
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VB only through A3, the optimal level VB
*
 is derived solving ∂A3/∂VB = 0 . This value is given by the  
implicit expression: 0)()1()( 12211
1
1
2    BB VAV
r
C
. Straightforward computation on 
(2) leads to the following: 
 
Proposition 1. The value of the firm’s equity decreases as the ambiguity perceived by the ambiguity 
averse DM increases. 
An example
7
 is depicted in Figure 1. The value of equity E(V) is increasing in V, exhibiting the usual 
shape of a call-option. The default threshold 
BV is obtained as the intersection between the curve and 
the horizontal axis. Three different values of the parameter c are used to show the effect of ambiguity 
on the equity value. The equity curve shifts downwards monotonically as c decreases, that is, as 
ambiguity increases. 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The managerial implication of Proposition 1 is as follows. If DM has imprecise knowledge about the 
state of the world, and hence perceives the future as ambiguous, then he/she underestimates the upside 
potential because he/she makes decisions on “the worst case” scenario. This result contrasts with what 
is usually obtained for an increase in risk, as measured by the volatility  . An increase in risk in the 
sense of mean-preserving spread raises the option value and hence lowers the default trigger. Indeed, 
the firm may capture the upside gains and minimize the downside loss, by staying in business longer in 
riskier situations, waiting for the risk to be partially resolved (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Thus, the 
value of the firm’s equity increases with volatility, while it decreases as ambiguity increases. The 
results in Remarks 1 and 2 follow as well: 
                                                 
7
 The parameter values are similar to Asvanunt, Broadie and Sundaresan (2011) and consistent with previous works (see 
Leland, 1994). 
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Remark 1. The default threshold   
BV   increases as the ambiguity perceived by the ambiguity averse 
DM increases. 
 As perceived ambiguity increases, equity holders choose a higher default level and hence enter 
financial distress earlier. This occurs because the value of the option to keep the firm open decreases 
with a higher ambiguity aversion bias, which reduces the variance in the Choquet-Brownian motion. 
Thus, ambiguity averse DMs default sooner because they undervalue the option value given by the 
continuation value of equity. This prediction seems to be consistent with the large amount of quick 
exits in recent recessions (Routledge and Zin, 2009), which contrasts with a risk prediction. Firms are 
more ambiguous about  industry demand, productivity and when the economy will recover, making 
them less willing to hold the option and hence they exercise the option, i.e. default, earlier. 
 
Remark 2. The value of the firm’s equity decreases as the cost of equity dilution (  ) increases. 
Therefore, with costly equity dilution, the effect of ambiguity on equity value is reinforced, because 
equity declines at a faster rate. As a consequence of Remark 2, BV increases as   increases. 
Let us now determine the value of the firm’s debt. If the firm liquidates its assets upon bankruptcy, a 
fraction α is lost due to liquidation costs. Thus, due to limited liability, debt holders will only receive 
.)1()( BB VVD   The value of the firm’s debt D(V) is determined in the Appendix and has the 
following expression:  
      
1
)1()(
















B
B
V
V
r
C
V
r
C
VD  if V ≥ VB  .                  (3) 
The following Proposition holds: 
Proposition 2. The value of the firm’s debt increases as the ambiguity perceived by the ambiguity 
averse DM increases. 
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An example is depicted in Figure 2, where the same parameters of Figure 1 are used. The debt value 
D(V) increases with V, and for sufficiently large V it flattens out to the risk-free value C/r. Three 
different values of the parameter c are used to show the effect of ambiguity on the debt value. The debt 
curve shifts upwards as c decreases.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Also this result contrasts with what is usually obtained for an increase in uncertainty as measured by 
the volatility  : the value of debt decreases with volatility, while it increases with ambiguity. 
Ambiguity averse DMs may over lever their firm because they scale down asset volatility. So the 
effects of risk and perceived ambiguity go in opposite directions.  
The intuition of our results resembles that of a firm facing the corresponding ambiguous static decision 
problem. Following the requirement for dynamic consistency, assume the DM’s beliefs can 
equivalently be represented by a probability distribution. An increase in the level of ambiguity changes 
the initial equivalent probability distribution into one whose mean and variance are reduced. 
The firm is financed by equity and debt and is vulnerable to bankruptcy. The value of its equity is 
determined by limited liability considerations. An increase in ambiguity now tends to decrease the 
probability weight on high returns. As a consequence, the value of equity decreases. As in the results 
for the ambiguous stochastic process (Propositions 1 and 2), the effect of an increase in ambiguity is 
opposite to the standard effect of an increase in volatility. 
In a nutshell: the limited liability effect of enhanced risk makes equity holders more aggressive, which 
increases default risk and reduces the value of debt. An increase in ambiguity, on the other hand, 
changes the stochastic process perceived by the DM by reducing both its mean and its variance, 
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making equity holders less aggressive. This mitigates against the limited liability effect, by increasing 
the recovery rate in case of default.  
             
3. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
3.1. PECKING ORDER FINANCING DECISIONS 
It is well-known that the general rule of the pecking order hypothesis for the issuance of securities 
suggests the order of preference to be: firstly internal funds, if available; then debt, if external funds 
are needed; and finally equity. This rule is discussed in the seminal contribution by Myers and Majluf 
(1984), and suggests that firms issue the securities that carry the smallest adverse selection cost, i.e. are 
least likely to be mispriced by imperfectly informed outside investors. Debt dominates new equity, 
because it is considered to be robust against mispricing. 
However, debt can create information problems of its own if there is a significant probability of 
default. The pecking order hypothesis has been challenged within the theory of optimal design of 
securities under asymmetric information (see Giammarino and Neave (1982), Nachman and Noe 
(1994), and Fulghieri and Lukin, 2001). In addition, much empirical work challenges the pecking order 
hypothesis (see, e.g. Hennessy, Livdan and Miranda, 2010, Leary and Roberts, 2010, and Halov and 
Heider, 2011)
8
.  
In this section we reconsider the pecking order puzzle within the framework of our model with 
ambiguity. Let us consider a situation where the DM’s valuation reflects his/her ambiguity aversion 
bias, while the market’s valuation is not biased by ambiguity aversion. Harvey and Siddique (2000) 
and Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) report that corporate boards often weigh differently the risks 
                                                 
8
 Leary and Roberts (2010), p. 332, write “For example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) conclude that the pecking order 
is a good descriptor of broad financing patterns; Frank and Goyal (2003) conclude the opposite. Lemmon and Zender 
(2004) conclude that a “modified” pecking order – which takes into account financial distress costs – it is a good descriptor 
of financing behaviour;  Fama and French (2005) conclude the opposite. Frank and Goyal (2003) conclude that the pecking 
order better describes the behaviour of large firms, as opposed to small firms; Fama and French (2005) conclude the 
opposite. Finally, Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) argue that firms facing low information asymmetry account for the 
bulk of the pecking order’s failings; Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) conclude the opposite”. 
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correlated with downside losses vs those linked to upside gains, in a way which seems to be  consistent 
with ambiguity aversion. On the other hand, despite ample evidence of ambiguity aversion in 
individual decision making, various studies find no or only limited ambiguity aversion surviving in 
financial markets, if ambiguity attitudes of market participants are very heterogeneous (see Fullbrunn, 
Rau and Weitzel (2014) and references therein; see also Olsson, 2014). So, we suppose that the DM 
believes that cash flows are described by expression (1) with c < 1/2, whereas the market’s valuation is 
as if the cash flows are described by expression (1) with c = 1/2. By plotting D(V)/E(V), we find for 
any value V of the firm’s assets, that when the ambiguity perceived by the ambiguity averse DM 
increases, D(V)/E(V) increases as well (see Figure 3). This implies that the DM believes that equity is 
more overvalued by the market than debt. Hence, the DM will prefer issuing equity rather than debt, 
which results in a reversal of the standard pecking order financing behaviour. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
The argument can be summarized as follows: 
 
Proposition 3. A reversal of the standard pecking order may occur if the ambiguity aversion bias of 
the DM exceeds that of market. 
The result in Proposition 3 poses a challenge for the standard pecking order: managers may not (may) 
follow a pecking order if they have a larger (smaller) ambiguity aversion bias than the market’s 
valuations. This result can be seen partly as a consequence of the fact that ambiguity aversion leads to 
a reduction of the drift of the stochastic process as perceived by the firm insider with respect to the 
external market. This means that ambiguity aversion effectively makes insiders more “pessimistic” 
than the external market. In this light, equity is preferred because insiders issue overvalued securities.  
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The way this managerial bias affects the pecking order preferences may help explain the inconclusive 
cross-sectional findings on the observed heterogeneity in capital structures and standard pecking order 
predictions. Our result is also in keeping with the theoretical literature on the pecking order, showing 
that asymmetries relating to the information available to managers and to investors may lead to a 
reversal in the preferences (Giammarino and Neave, 1982, and Nachman and Noe, 1994, Hackbarth, 
2008)
9
. These contributions, however, consider forms of asymmetric information, rather than 
differences in the ambiguity aversion bias. 
Of course, if the market is more ambiguity averse than the manager, then the manager will prefer 
issuing debt rather than equity, and an increase in ambiguity aversion in the market will lead to 
aversion to equity, consistently with the pecking order prediction of financing decisions. Therefore, the 
theoretical predictions about the effects of ambiguity on capital structure are somewhat sensitive to the 
modeling framework and the divergence in ambiguity assessment. 
 
3.2. CORPORATE LIQUIDITY POLICIES 
Now suppose that the firm can hold cash reserves and assume that the accumulated net revenues up to 
time t can be described by a Bachelier additive model. Its use simplifies the mathematical structure of 
our model and allows us to consider net cash flows that may become negative when the firm’s 
revenues are insufficient to cover its costs. We assume the firm acts in the best interest of its equity 
holders and maximizes the expected present value of dividends up to default. We further assume that 
the firm has no access to capital markets and that equity dilution is not possible. As a consequence, 
default occurs as soon as the cash process net of the coupon payment, hits the threshold 0. Denote the 
                                                 
9
 Nachman and Noe (1994) show that debt emerges as the solution of an optimal security design problem if and only if the 
private information held by firm insiders orders the distribution of firm value by conditional stochastic dominance. This 
condition is satisfied in Myers and Majluf (1984), but does not hold more generally. 
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total dividends distributed up to time t by tZ , where tdZ   0. Now the firm’s cash reserve tX evolves 
according
10
 to: 
 ,)( ttt dZdBsdtmqrdX   0 0tt                    (8) 
 ,0 tt dZdX  0tt    
with 00  xX  being given. The firm chooses its liquidity policy to maximize its total profits, i.e the 
expected total discounted dividends 
  E x t
rtdZe


0
. 
Accordingly, we define )(xV sup E x t
rtdZe


0
 where the sup is taken over all admissible control 
policies. The problem reduces to the classical dividend policy problem, formulated as a mixed 
singular control/optimal stopping problem, as in Jeanblanc-Picquè and Shiraev (1995), Radner and 
Shepp (1996) and Decamps and Villeneuve (2007, 2013), but here the effects of ambiguity are 
incorporated into the model. Calculations following the same arguments as in this literature lead to the 
following solution: 
 
Proposition 4. The value of the firm’s assets is given by: 
 ),
*)('
)(
,0max()(
xf
xf
xV      for        *0 xx   
*),(*)( xVxxxV    for        *xx   
where 
 BxAx eexf )( ,  
 2)ln(
1
*
A
B
BA
x

  
                                                 
10
 Expression (8) is obtained  from  
tdX = tdWdtqr  )( tdZ , where tt sBmtW    and tB  is a Wiener process. 
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The managerial implication of Proposition 4 is as follows. If the cash process falls below the coupon 
payment, this leads to immediate bankruptcy. Whenever the cash process exceeds the threshold value 
for paying out dividends, x ≥ x*, the optimal policy pays out all cash in excess of the threshold value 
x
*
. If the cash process falls below the critical level x
*
, but exceeds the coupon payment, then no 
dividends are paid, but bankruptcy is avoided.  
This “all-or-nothing” policy is common to the classical dividend policy of the literature mentioned 
above. It finds that the optimal choice of dZt is singular: in the “dividend” region where  
x ≥ x*, that is, where the liquidity reserve becomes too high, it is optimal to pay dividends as quickly as 
possible, reducing the cash holdings until either the liquidity reserve returns to the “save” region, 
where the firm will not pay dividends, or until the firm is bankrupt.  
This formulation can be extended to allow the firm to issue new equity. In this case, another “issue” 
region will be added, lying below the “save” region, such that if the liquidity reserve becomes too low, 
then new equity is issued to return to the “save” region (see also Anderson and Carverhill, 2011). 
Another extension could consider lumpy investments and uncertain capital supply, which not only 
affects the pecking order of sources of finance, but also leads to several different regions relating to the 
firm’s dividend policy (see Hugonnier, Malamud and Morellec, 2015). For the sake of simplicity, we 
do not pursue these possibilities here and instead focus on the effect of ambiguity within the classical 
framework. 
To see how ambiguity affects the optimal dividend policy, we need to know how the critical threshold 
x
*
 changes as c changes. Calculation of ∂x*/∂c leads to the following: 
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Proposition 5. The critical threshold value of the cash process is non monotonic and increases 
(decreases) for high (low) levels of ambiguity aversion.  
An example is provided in Figure 4, where the threshold  x* + C  is plotted against c, for 0 < c < ½. 
 
                                                                        Figure 4 about here 
 
The threshold can be seen as a liquidity target. As ambiguity increases up to a certain level, the threshold 
decreases. Dividends are “a bird in the hand”, so ambiguity averse DMs prefer dividend payments, because they 
try to avoid uncertainties as much as possible (see Breuer, Rieger and Soypak, 2014b). As ambiguity increases, 
equity holders prefer to realize their gains as quick as possible. However, dividend payments increase the risk of 
default. Cash balances provide with cushions from premature liquidation. Thus, as DMs with a higher ambiguity 
aversion head toward bankruptcy, they will not empty out the cash balance, but retain cash, remaining solvent 
longer. 
Notice that the effects of an increase in ambiguity aversion bias and an increase in volatility on the threshold do 
not align. Figure 5 depicts the critical threshold for c = ½ as a function of volatility. We observe that the 
threshold is monotonically increasing in volatility. 
 
                                                                      Figure 5 about here 
 
In summary, we find that cash holdings are retained longer if the DM’s ambiguity aversion bias is sufficiently 
large. This result is consistent both with the observed change in cash holdings in periods of turbulence and 
vague uncertainty, and with the literature justifying large cash holdings because of the precautionary motive. 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) showed that an increase in the cash-to-assets ratio of firms was related tightly to 
precautionary motives. They constructed a measure of cash-flow uncertainty and showed that firms with higher 
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uncertainty in their cash flows had higher cash-to-assets ratios. Additionally, we find that for relatively small 
ambiguity aversion biases, cash holdings become less attractive.  In this case, the DM prefers to receive 
dividends instead. This corporate dividend policy is consistent with the empirical findings of Breuer, Rieger and 
Soypak (2014b) that provide a cross-country analysis across a sample of 29 countries for which data on 
behavioral variables were collected via a comprehensive survey. They verified empirically that various 
measures of firms’ dividend levels were increasing in ambiguity aversion. 
 
3.3. EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS 
Providing empirical support for our results is not straightforward, due to the difficulty in finding a convincing 
proxy for the size of the ambiguity aversion bias. Recent work by Rieger, Wang and Hens (2015) employs a 
methodology to measure the average ambiguity aversion across different countries, and this methodology might 
be adapted to our framework in order to estimate the level of the ambiguity aversion.  
As a preliminary step we analyzed cross-country average leverage values - where leverage is defined 
as book value of long term debt (item 106 in Compustat Global database) over market value of total 
assets, calculated as book value of total assets (item 89) minus book value of equity (item 146) plus 
market value of equity (item MKVAL) - over a period of five years for 24 countries
11
. The average 
ambiguity aversion across these countries is provided by Rieger, Wang and Hens (2015) and is 
mapped into the parameter c. We found a significant positive correlation (0.566) between leverage and 
ambiguity bias (see Figure 6), which is consistent with our results.  
 
                                                                         Figure 6 about here 
 
Initial empirical evidence showing that ambiguity aversion is positively associated with cash holdings 
                                                 
11
 Australia, Austria, US, UK, Finland, Germany, Colombia, Sweden, Italy, New Zealand, France, The Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Argentina, Denmark, Malaysia, Portugal, Spain, Japan, Mexico, China, Chile, Canada, Thailand. 
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is provided in Neamtiu, Shroff, White and Williams (2014). They show that when managers are faced 
with ambiguity about future investment payoffs, they are likely to reduce their capital expenditures 
and increase their cash holdings. They use the dispersion in forecasts of corporate profits from the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters as a proxy for the level of ambiguity. 
 
In contrast, Breuer, Rieger and Soypak (2014a) find that for financially constrained firms cash 
holdings decrease with increasing ambiguity aversion, while they get inconclusive results for 
unconstrained firms. They employed the ambiguity aversion parameter obtained via the international 
test of ambiguity survey as in Rieger, Wang and Hens (2015). Although the above-mentioned results 
seem conflicting, they might benefit from being interpreted within the context of our model in Section 
3.2, which offers a general framework for understanding corporate decisions under ambiguity. 
 
 4. CONCLUSION 
In this study we examine the effects of ambiguity on corporate financial decisions and cash holdings. 
Following the capacity approach, we describe the firm value as a Choquet Brownian process, and 
predict that greater ambiguity will lead firms to decrease equity, increase debt and enter financial 
distress earlier. This study offers several contributions. First, we contribute to the ambiguity literature 
regarding the impact of ambiguity on corporate financial decisions, which has never been studied in a 
real-option framework like ours. Second, we contribute to the theoretical debate about the conditions 
under which a pecking order for the issuing of securities exists. Finally, we examine in which manner 
ambiguity affects corporate cash holdings. We show that cash holdings are retained longer if the 
investors’ ambiguity aversion bias is sufficiently large, while cash holdings become less attractive 
when the combined impact of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion is relatively low.  
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Overall, our results shed new light on some biases in corporate beliefs, which have implications for 
corporate finance. Our study shows that perceived ambiguity is a determinant in behavioural corporate 
finance and significantly affects managerial decisions. 
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   Appendix 
 
Equity Value under Ambiguity 
Following the dynamic programming methods (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), we derive the value of 
equity by solving the system: 
0)()()('))(()(''
2
1 222  CqVVrEVVEmqrVEVs     if 
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V                        (A.2) 
In addition, the following boundary conditions must be satisfied: 
 BC: 0)( BVE   
   )()(:
q
C
E
q
C
EVM  
 :SP  
  )(')('
q
C
E
q
C
E  
that is, equity holders receive nothing at bankruptcy (BC), and the value matching (VM) and smooth 
pasting (SP) conditions hold at C/q (see also Asvanunt, Broadie and Sundaresan, 2011). Moreover, we 
impose the condition that E(V) asymptotically behaves like V when the firm’s value approaches 
infinity.   
We start by determining, the first and the second derivatives of the general solution to (A.1): 
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Substituting them into (A.1), we obtain: 
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Rearranging this expression by gathering the terms relating to V,  and  we find: 
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Setting the coefficients equal to zero we obtain  0A =
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and ω2 as specified in expression (2) in the main text, where ω1 is positive and ω2 negative.  
Applying the same procedure to the general solution of (A.2), 12 3210
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The remaining coefficients, A2, A3, and 3Aˆ , as in expression (2), are now determined by solving the 
equations: 
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Debt Value under Ambiguity 
The value of the firm’s debt D(V) is determined solving the following equation: 
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The coefficients B0 and B1 are determined by gathering the constant and the coefficient of the V term 
and setting them equal to zero: 
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Figure 1.   Value of the firm’s equity under ambiguity 
C = 2.3,  0.2, r =0.05, q = 0.03,  0.3,  1  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                
 
                              Figure 2 – Value of the firm’s debt under ambiguity 
C = 2.3,  0.2, r =0.05, q = 0.03,  0.3,  1 
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Figure 3 – Debt/Equity Value under ambiguity 
      C = 2.3,  0.2, r =0.05, q = 0.03,  0.3,  1  
 
 
 
                                        Figure 4 – The threshold for different values of ambiguity 
C = 2.3,  0.2, r =0.05, q = 0.03  
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                                           Figure 5 – The threshold for different values of  volatility 
C = 2.3, r =0.05, q = 0.03, c=1/2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Cross-country leverage vs ambiguity aversion 
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